Abstract. District heating, the conversion of primary energy into distributed thermal energy and possible electric energy, is a challenge to regulate. In addition to the ever present asymmetric information in any su¢ciently complex activity, some of the inputs for district heating, such as excess process heat, have arbitrary valuation. This study concerns the most developed European district heating and cogeneration system, the Danish. By assessing environmental and economic e¢ciency, the impact of governmental, market and managerial imperfections are estimated. The principal methodological base is the additive Data Envelopment Analysis model with extensions. The paper ends with some policy suggestions.
Introduction
The regulation of natural monopolies with high asset speci…city is a complex task, in practice as well as in theory. Ever since the revival of regulatory economics in the early 1980s, the focus has been on the properties of the asymmetric information between regulator and regulated and its consequences on the …rm's performance. Whatever angle is chosen, the transaction cost approach by Williamson (1976) , the institutionalist approach by Demsetz (1969) , the agency theory by Laffont and Tirole (1984) or the neo-classical Chadwickian approach by Klein and Le-er (1981) , there is a intensi…ed need for information and acknowledgement of the performances of the individual franchises. Systematic benchmarking through e¢ciency measurement is one method to ensure the accountability of the protected market operators. Two e¤ects are obtained by such an exercise: First, the regulated …rms are exposed to a quasi-competition, where the managerial e¤orts are gauged more than the actual economic realization. This information enables the …rms to learn from successful technologies, routines and organizational forms. Second, the regulator and the captured clients are given yardstick norms, against which they may compare the performance of an individual …rm. Related work (Bogetoft, 1994) on how to utilize the performance measures in actual incentive schemes may also be employed to create optimal regulatory regimes. This paper reports on the e¢ciency of Danish heat plants and combined heat and power plants (CHPs) for district heating during 1998-2000. The CHP technology is inherently multidimensional, turning primary energy (process heat recovery, fossil fuels, biogas, pellets and other sources of energy) into both thermal and electric energy. The thermal energy, which anyway would result from the thermoelectric production, is utilized for district heating for subscribing customers. However, the process is characterized by losses due to process (conversion losses), heat transmission (transmission losses) and demand characteristics (balance losses). The managerial e¤orts are concentrated on the e¢cient conversion of primary fuels, depending on ‡uctuating prices and contractual agreements, to balance production. In terms of governance, there are publicly owned utilities (15%), cooperative nonpro…t utilities (84%) and commercial energy providers (1%). The non-commercial plants operate under cost-of-service regulation.
Primarily for environmental reasons, the Danish government subsidized the construction of cogeneration plants during the 1980s, even in small and medium scale applications. Several distortions were introduced to the cogeneration market. First, the fuel cost was initially skewed to favor domestic natural gas, causing a high number of small-scale gas plants to be installed. Second, to protect the incumbents against competing heating options, the incumbent plants were granted preemptive delivery and connection rights at their locations. Third, to counterbalance the latter action, the plants were put under a not-for-pro…t regime. Fourth, cogeneration plants were given exclusive rights to feed generated electricity to the local distributor at a preferential tari¤, regardless of prevailing market price. The result was a strong increase in district heating and installation of decentralized heat plants. More than 50% of the non-industrial heat market was covered 1990 by district heating, considerably higher than in any comparable country, cf. Hendriks and Blok (1996) . However, when opening parts of the fuel market for competition in accordance with EU-regulations, the economy of the cogeneration plants as well as of their captive customers have come to the government's attention. The construction of the district heat concession in combination with integrated production technology clearly opens for crossubsidization of the competitive activity at the expense of the captive consumers. As the accounting practice does not necessarily provide the regulator with an unambiguous allocation scheme for the quasi-rent on sunk investments, there is ample room to exploit market power in the current setup. A cost-e¢ciency assessment here serves an important role to gauge the extent to which informational rents are being extracted.
A simplistic implementation of cost-e¢ciency towards alternative technologies, however, would not yield feasible policy results. Thermal energy always is at disadvantage compared to hydroelectric generation, since the prior storage of the primary energy is attached with substantial costs, whereas hydroenergy has no holding costs. It is also of considerable policy relevance to distinguish between excess costs due to a legislative dead-weight, i.e., the technological lock-in in expensive fuel choices, and informational rents that are due to montioring costs and lack of e¤ort by disincentivized managers, i.e., non-competitive acquisition of fuel, excessive transmission losses, or indirect extraction of rents through operating expenditure. A fair ex post analysis used as a part of an ex ante regime also needs to account for the prior uncertainty in prices on fuel and output that prevail. Further, from an operational viewpoint, there is little interest to benchmark against average performance, given that a large proportion of the plants are small and allegedly economically ine¢cient, which automatically would render the large-scale cogeneration plants suboptimal informational rents. Thus, the district heat industry in Denmark is well suited for the ‡exible production space description in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
Pricing the environmental e¤ects on reduction of CO 2 and other emission levels directly would imply certain arbitrariness and would not necessarily help to promote managerial e¢ciency. However, by using the ‡exible production frontier in DEA, estimates may be given on optimal production in the long and short run, without specifying the trade-o¤ ratios. The approach has also the added managerial bene…t of highlighting best practice, rather than average practice. In a non-competitive sector with motivation problems, average performance may be well in the interior of the production opportunity set.
Currently, there are some 450 district heating plants in Denmark, producing over 120,000 TJ of thermal energy and 2.3 TWh of cogenerated electric power. The length of the distribution network is over 47,000 km, supplying 1.4 million households (56% of all households) in Denmark. Many of the plants are very small, 70% of the thermic heat is produced by 10% of the plants. The primary fuel technologies are varying between coal, oil, natural gas, straw, wood chips, and other bio fuel. The majority of the plants (73%) distribute heat from cogeneration plants, but also industrial heat and heat from waste incineration are employed. The Danish Association of District Heating Utilities (DFF) organizes most of the producers (98% of total heat volume, 410 members in 2000) and also publishes detailed statistics on the industry (answering frequency 79% of total plants, or 88% of total heat volume).
Data Envelopment Analysis
To formalize the above, we assume that each decision making units (DMU) in a comparable set, say i 2 G; transform m x controllable inputs x i and m z noncontrollable categorical outputs z i into m y outputs y i . The prices, if existing, on the controllable inputs and outputs are w i 2 R mx + and p i 2 R my + : We assume that the technological possibilities are the same for all DMUs' (except for the di¤erences captured by the non-controllable) variables. Speci…cally, these possibilities may be thought of as the set T of feasible input -output combinations T = f(x; z; y)j(x; z) can produce yg
We shall generally assume that T satisfy Condition 1. Free disposability: (x; z; y) 2 T; x
Condition 2. Convexity: T is convex.
Condition 3. r returns to scale, (x; z; y) 2 T =) (qx; z; qy) 2 T; 8q 2 ¡ (r) ;where r = "crs"; "drs; " or "vrs"; and ¡(crs) = < 0 ; ¡ (drs) = [0; 1] and ¡ (vrs) = f1g, respectively.
Note that our de…nition of non-controllable variables implies a non-convex partitioning of the set G, such that the reference set for any DMU only contains units that individually face at least as di¢cult operating conditions. A radial inputoriented distance measure for the e¢ciency under r returns to scale is de…ned by µ i (r; G), the optimal solution to the program min µ µ;ş :t:
where
The second constraint assures that DMU i is only compared to convex combinations of DMUs, each of which have similar or worse conditions z, cf. Agrell and Tind (2001) . In this application, the so called additive model is also applied for primarily two reasons.
Firstly, the radial model is a rough instrument to assess ine¢ciency when T is highly multidimensional and technologies frequently involve zero valued inputs. Although theoretically the slack variables would indicate residual slack for weakly e¢cient observations, the radial optimization problem is often di¢cult or impossible to solve under these degenerate conditions. The additive model is computationally superior to the radial and fully extremizes the slack variables to obtain strongly e¢cient comparators. Thus, it allows a greater ‡exibility in the trade-o¤ between aggregation, possibly distorting the managerial discretion, and detail, threatening to impoverish the production model. Secondly, the common disadvantages attached to the additive model, the lack of decomposition properties, sensitivity to scale and ambiguous interpretation, are addressed in this work. Below, we o¤er simple decomposition schemes based on exogenous prices to enable technological, cost and allocative e¢ciency measures. The scale sensitivity is irrelevant as so far as the unit of measurement in this application predominantly are commensurate, and elsewhere uniformly applied. Thanks to the decomposition and the modelling, the interpretation is unambiguous and clear.
Let the vector of input slacks be s i (r; G) 2 R mx for unit i; obtained as the solution to the program (2.1)
A technical e¢ciency measure T E i , analogous to the radial model µ i above may be immediately calculated as
Thus, DMU i is technically input-e¢cient i¤ s i h = 0 for all inputs h , corresponding to the situation µ i = 1 and all input constraints are binding. The formulation 2.2 di¤ers from µ i as it is done outside of the program, avoiding a potential scaling problem. Similarily, the scale e¢ciency SE i (G) for a DMU i 2 G may be de…ned using the standard de…nition from radial models as the ratio between the technical e¢ciency under constant returns to scale and technical e¢ciency under variable returns to scale.
The cost-e¢ciency model CE takes into account the average prices w i of inputs to assess the full economic implications of the chosen resource mix. Let
be the total relevant cost for DMU i. The cost e¢ciency CE i (r; G) for DMU i for a reference set G under r returns to scale assumption, given the resulting slack variables s i from the additive model, local prices and assuming C i > 0, will then be calculated as
However, we note that the solution to 2.3 need not be the correct in the case where the measuring units of x implicitly give a skewed substitution rate in problem 2.1. As apposed to the radial model that is translation invariant, care should be exercised with the additive model to maintain the correct substitution rates. Here, we will initially make the restrictive assumption that x is a vector of commensurate input units (e.g. input cost categories), such that 2.1 in itself yields a cost-e¢ciency measure.
Dynamic productivity evaluation is made with the Malmquist index. Assuming access to panel data for the years t and t+1, we may calculate the dynamic e¢ciency changes by using the Malmquist index M i (t; t + 1) : Here, using the decomposition of Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), the relation between the frontier change EF and the individual e¢ciency catch-up e¤ect EC is given by
where the superscript i of the DMU has been suppressed for clarity.
Models
When modelling the district heating activity in an production e¢ciency model, attention has to be paid with respect to the controllable variables. As the demand for heat, given the strong delivery privileges, has very limited substitution, the elasticity is deemed high. For the purposes of this paper, the output of heat, electricity and heating capacity are judged exogenously given. The inputs for the activity are the asset base, the capital, the primary energy input, labour and other expenses. Two reasons speak against using capital in the current model. First, the valuation of capital that is available in the accounting data is based on historic and possibly distorted costs. There is evidence that depreciation practices in public and regulated utilities in no way mimic the true replacement cost, nor any plausible cost of capital. Rather, the depreciation has been made ad hoc for mainly …scal motivations. Second, the capital base, in the short run operation perspective must be considered a sunk speci…c investment. It is from a myopic economic viewpoint irrelevant whether this stranded cost is covered directly through taxes, distributed on the captive customers, or deducted from the initial investors' equity, as long as the demand is not a¤ected. In short, the question on how to allocate quasi-rents on sunk investments must be separated from the evaluation of the operations of the …rm. Since part of the rationale for this evaluation is to pinpoint market distortions and non-economic operations, it is moreover likely that a considerable part of the investments may not be repeated.
Let us start with the long-term ideal perspective. Below, we suppress the superscript k for plant k = 1; :::; n: Recognizing that the Danish government's promotion of district heating rather than individual boilers has an environmental justi…cation, we include the total carbondioxide (CO 2 ) emission as a controllable input, x co2 . This input has no given price and is calculated as the cascading CO 2 -emission in primary and secondary fuels. For secondary heat for which the source of energy is known, direct accounting has been used. For electricity, industrial heat and unspeci…ed secondary energy sources, national average estimates have been used. In particular for electricity, the value used is the CO 2 -emission per net GWh from power plants. The plant has a primary fuel vector x p = fx oil ; x coal ; x gas ; x wood ; x straw ; x biot ; x elec g where x oil is the primary energy input from oil in TJ, x coal is the coal input in TJ, x gas is the natural gas input in TJ; x wood is the woodchips or pellets input in TJ; x straw is the straw input in TJ, x elec is the electrical energy consumed in MWh and x biot is the amount of primary input from other biofuels in TJ. The secondary heat vector x s = fx chp ; x ind ; x inc ; x heatot g consist of x chp ; the purchased heat input in TJ from a generating plant, x ind as the input of industrial heat in TJ; x inc as the input (in TJ) of heat from waste incineration and x heatot as the secondary energy input (in TJ) of other heat. Cost data is also known as c opex for the total non-capital operating expenditures for operation, maintenance, administration and metering in millions of Danish crowns (MDKK), c heat which is the total cost for primary and secondary energy. The cost for primary energy may also be divided into components c p h , the primary fuel expenditure (in MDKK) for primary fuel h = foil; coal; wood; straw; biot; elecg : On the output side, we denote y heat as net delivered thermal energy in TJ, y elec as delivered electric energy in GWh, and y cust as the number of subscribed connection points of the distribution system. The revenue (in MDKK) generated from sales of electricity is denoted by R elec . The length of the network z pipe (in km) is here considered as a non-discretionary variable that serves as a proxy for capital intensity required. In the context of an output-oriented model, the inclusion of the network as an output would have been meaningless. Likewise, the inclusion of network as a controllable input would have been void in the absence of a proxy for the customer density.
To get a lower bound to the cost of service for heat, assume that the electrical output has no other value than a reduction of the cost of heat operations. Let the net non-capital cost be C netex = c opex + c heat ¡ R elec for each plant. We formulate the aggregated pro…t and environmental e¢ciency model AP EE as the minimization of total net operating cost C netex and the CO 2 -emission x co2 for each output vector fy heat ; y cust g given a network z pipe :
The results from AP EE, illustrated in Figure 1 , will by necessity be extreme and infeasible even in the long run, pointing at a major restructuring of the sector, change of technology, fuel providers and a further increase in the electricity production. As the preferential feed-in tari¤ is likely to be adjusted in the long run, the premium for change is overstated. In order to limit this in ‡uence from unknown electricity prices and to separate the fuel choice and fuel price e¤ect, we formulate an aggregated cost and environmental e¢ciency model ACEE. In this model, Figure 2 , the physical output electricity is measured in GWh and the non-capital cost is split in two inputs, c opex and c heat :
To capture the regulator's long-run interest of the trade-o¤ between environmental and economic e¢ciency, it may be of interest to make explicit the sector's cost of this added task. As a correction for ACEE, we formulate the aggregated cost e¢ciency model ACE by deleting the environmental x co2 as input, as in Figure 3 .
The models so far introduced cannot be applied to assess the managerial e¢-ciency of the already existing plants. First, the heat volume possible is determined by the delivery area, which is pre-assigned. Second, the fuel choice is given by the installed technology, …xed in the short run. The current boilers are not to be changed prematurely, since the investment subsidies are scarce and likely to be withdrawn. In short, the aggregation on the input side makes assumptions about the discretionary ability on behalf of the plant manager that are not correct.
To assess operating e¢ciency, two models are introduced. to be controllable within certain technologies, as well as operating expenditure in its entirety. The inputs are thus x opex ; x elec ; x gas ; and the aggregates x oilcoal = x oil + x coal ; x bio = x wood + x straw + x biot and x s = x chp + x ind + x inc + x heatot : Further, as the energy sources correspond to given CO 2 -emission levels, the environmental input is redundant. Although this model also overstates the substitution possibilities between fuels and secondary heat sources, it does represent the most important plant technologies. The model is illustrated in Figure 4 . Finally, the operational cost e¢ciency model OCE in Figure 5 captures the allocated budget to energy sources, as given by the available accounting data. Unfortunately, the data does not permit the calculation of reliable local prices of energy. Instead, we use the gross expenditures for the analogous groups as in model OT E (Figure 4) . Hence, the inputs are c opex; c elec; c gas ; c oilcoal; c bio ; c s : The model is a disaggregated cost-e¢ciency model with all inputs in monetary terms (MDKK).
Due to numerical problems related to the size and sparsity of the matrix, the two latter models cannot be reliably solved using the radial model as above. Since the technology is easy to interpret and the inputs of model OCE are measured in a common unit, the additive formulation lends itself as an easy solution.
In this particular context, market prices w i exist for all fuels but the predominant industrial heat, where prices are in part endogenously given as accounting production costs, given an arbitrary allocation of the …xed costs. However, since the purpose is to give a conservative estimate of the managerial e¢ciency, we choose to value the slack heat at the lowest of primary fuel prices, w s = min h fw ph g ; which in this case corresponds to the price of biofuel (straw). Since all inputs of OCE are nominated in MDKK, the valuation of s opex and all input slacks are set to 1. Note that the obtained cost e¢ciency estimate for the additive model never will exceed a radial estimate, since all possible (non-proportional) input slacks are correctly valued. In this sense, the applied model gives both a more fair and more detailed description of the production set.
MODEL OCE

Data
The data set includes 408 district heat plants in Denmark, divided into observations for the year 1998-99 and 1999-2000. Screening the data for omitted information and infeasibilities reduced the set to 310 observations 1998 and 253 observations 1999. In all 204 plants have valid and comparable data for both periods. In addition to the data directly utilized in the model, the set also includes technical data such as peak load, temperature levels feed-forward and return for Summer and Winter, total system water volume and the accounting costs for network, plants, operations, fuel, administration and net result. Tables 1 and 2 give a ‡avor of the descriptive statistics in the data set.
As given from Figure 6 and the apparent di¤erence between mean and median values in Tables above, the majority of the Danish district heat plants are small and have sparse networks. In a sample of 285 plants with distribution network 1998, the 10 plants with the most dense network produce 43% of the total heat production. This immediately hints at the di¤erences in underlying technology, where a large number of plants have mono-fuel technologies, low customer density and high-loss distribution networks. 
Results
Some aggregated results from the domestic e¢ciency study are presented in Table  3 for the heatyears 1998/1999 and in Table 4 for 1999/2000. The e¢cient units exhibit the usual spread of technologies that may be expected in a non-parametric analysis under variable returns to scale. A convenient comparative table (Table 5) illustrates the …ndings as total cost estimates for the two years, divided into the cost categories operating expenditure and fuels, whenever possible. The estimated e¢cient inputs h = fopex; heatg for radial models (AP EE; ACE; ACEE) are obtained as
and for additive models (OT E; OCE) as
The last row of Table 5 gives the actual realized expenditure for the relevant sample. The rather high scale e¢ciency (e.g., for the ACE model, SE (98) = 0:918 and SE (99) = 0:914) does not provide evidence for any unexploited economies of scale. A more detailed subgrouping below reveals the central plants without distribution to more e¢cient, which in any case does not a¤ect the ranking of the distributing plants.
The net-pro…t model AP EE yields the predicted low scores for the industry in general. The few fully e¢cient plants are small distributors with heavy cogeneration, generating substantial contributions to the heat operations. To calculate the frontier three plants had to be removed from the 1998 sample, two of which had negative net expenditures, i.e., the heat consumer was debited only a part of the …xed cost and none of the variable. The increased heat demand in 1999/00 due to climate lowered the AP EE e¢ciency for comparable observations. Cogeneration was utilized less intensively, fuel prices increased and the resulting average net expenditure per delivered heat energy rose from 74.8 DKK/GJ to 84.8 DKK/GJ. As an orientation for the regulator, the average e¢cient levels of net expenditure were 33.2 DKK/GJ ( AP EE (crs; 98=99)) and 38.4 DKK/GJ ( AP EE (crs; 99=00)), respectively. The average e¢cient levels under variable returns to scale were 42.4 DKK/GJ ( AP EE (vrs; 98=99)) and 49.3 DKK/GJ ( AP EE (vrs; 99=00)), respectively.
Turning to the aggregated cost e¢ciency measure ACE, the scores are still fairly low, with average ine¢ciencies of 31-38% . Tables 3 and 4 display lower median than average scores, re ‡ecting the fact that the minimum scores are very low. Compared to AP EE the outcome of ACE less favor the extreme cogenerators, allowing some pure heating plants to reach the e¢cient frontier. Still, the full substitutability assumption in the c f uel input implies that the measure is purely for structural use. The 10% e¢cient plants in this world view ( ACE (vrs; 98=99)) produce 47% of the delivered heat using cost-e¢cient energy sources such as cogeneration heat, industrial process heat, waste incineration heat. The primary fuel conversion is atypical, only 2% of the total biofuels, 7% of the total natural gas and 7% of the oil fuel expenditure are passed through the e¢cient plants. Biofuels such as straw and woodchips, although competitively priced in other markets (Ek, 2000) do not make for cost e¢cient production in Denmark.
The environmental e¢ciency model ACEE provides an immediate corrective for model ACE, with the addition of the net carbondioxide (CO 2 ) emission 1 . However, as cost e¢cient production in the sense of ACE (primarily recovering cogeneration and process heat at favorable …nancial conditions) also is environmentally advantageous, the results largely coincide. Once again, the e¢cient plants are larger (15% of the plants 1998/99 deliver 50% of the total heat, ACEE (drs; 98=99)) and have lower primary energy conversion (52% of total secondary energy budget) . Their carbondioxide emissions are about 47% lower per net energy delivered ( ACEE (drs; 98=99)), much lower for crs results. A glance at Table 5 reveals that the total cost premium for this added environmental e¢ciency is moderate, some 6-7% on top of the ACE estimate, or about 300-350 MDKK annually. The cost increase due to inadequate scale, however, is 27% under low capacity utilization ( ACEE (drs; 98=99)) and 20% under higher heat volumes ( ACEE (drs; 99=00)).
Size is not the only determinant, as evident in Figure 7 . Clearly, the decentralized district heating comes at a premium, which only partially is o¤set by environmental bene…ts. Figure 8 gives another angle at the distribution of environmental e¢ciency, here graphed across the sum of operational and fuel expenditure. Descending to the operational level with the disaggregated model OT E gives a brighter picture for the fuel management at the decentralized plants. Given fuel and distribution technology, about half of the plants are e¢ciently operated. Some interesting di¤erences towards the structural measures are noticed. The ef…cient half of the plants delivers 85% of the total heat at lower operating and fuel costs (85.8 (87.4) DKK/GJ compared to 127.2 (140.3) DKK/GJ for 1998 and 1999, resp., OT E (vrs)) As opposed to the short-term competitive small cogenerators in AP EE, the best practice plants in OT E are less involved in electricity distribution (45% and 46% of total electricity generation, 1998 and 1999 resp., OT E (vrs)) than their ine¢cient peers. The reasoning is sound and based on marginal generating costs compared to the …xed tari¤s, although the marginal costs in this model is compared to average market prices. In terms of size, the average heat volume delivered of e¢cient plants is larger than average (436 and 575 TJ, OT E (vrs)), but considerably below the structural optimum (834 and 1,179 TJ for ACEE (drs)).
Finally, the operational cost e¢ciency of model OCE con…rms at large the …nd-ings from its physical counterpart OT E: However, when actual rather than average prices are taken into account, the e¢ciency drops for ine¢cient fuel purchases. Savings in secondary energy sources, valued at w straw in OT E, may here be compared to the average cost for e¢cient plants of 43.1 DKK/GJ ( OCE (vrs; 98=99)) and 45.2 DKK/GJ ( OCE (vrs; 99=00)) : This increases the estimated total cost as in Table 5 to some 23% (25%) above the ACE cost estimate, giving an estimate of the scope of market distortion costs, technology and managerial ine¢ciency. The potential managerial rent to be captured by regulatory action is thus limited to 9.1% (6.1%) of the total net operating expenditure, a fairly modest amount in the context.
The technological development of the industry (cf. Table 6 ) has been regressive during the period, measured using the ACEE (crs) environmental e¢ciency model with the fuel input is physical terms [TJ] . Independent of the fuel price increases, the Malmquist index of productivity change increased by 1.8%. The improvement is the residual e¤ect of negative catch-up trend (-4.8%) and a positive frontier movement. As argued above, the frontier change is propelled primarily by secondary energy sources, increased utilization of process heat, and continuing changes to non-fossil fuels. The negative catch-up e¤ect deserves more detailed analysis of plant size, technology, ownership, etc., some of which is performed below. Some dynamic results for subgroups are given in Table 7 , where ¹ j denotes the mean and ¾ j the standard deviation for Group j = f1; 2g : Beginning with the productivity development of the distributing (z pipe > 0) vs. the nondistributing heat producers, the latter group analysis shows a strong regress in Malmquist productivity for the pure heat producers (-13.7% compared to distributors). Apart from a general e¢ciency fall-behind e¤ect, shared among all plants, the heat plants also experienced a frontier digression in 1999/2000. Although further analysis is necessary to exactly determine the causes of this e¤ect, the …nding itself is important to refute the occasional intuition that correct scale is the only determinant in CHP e¢ciency.
Electricity cogenerators (y elec > 0) have a signi…cantly higher catch-up e¤ect than non-electricity producers. Part of this e¤ect comes from a somewhat slower productivity frontier change, the other probably due to closer to optimal size distribution among cogenerators.
Plants with natural gas fuelling (x gas > 0) as well as plants without primary energy sources demonstrate less individual fall-back than other plants, for analogous reasons. The technological change seems very weak and the Malmquist index is close to 1. Albeit a comparatively expensive energy source, it o¤ers a fairly reliable Table 7 . Dynamic e¢ciency analysis of subgroups (Group 2 consists of all plants not in Group 1). * denotes signi…cant di¤erence on the 0.975-level.
Group 1
Measure and stable technology with low e¢ciency variance. For the plants that rely on cogeneration or process heat (x s > 0:9x heat ), the activity may also be characterized as stable when prices are controlled for. Contrary to the stationary gas plants, solid biofuels (woodchips, straw, peat, etc.) as primary energy sources (x biot > 0) demonstrated rapid frontier changes, resulting in signi…cantly lower catch-up scores. Varying prices and sources may have contributed to the instability, as well as an adverse selection in plant size and network density.
Dwelling at the issue of pure heat producers, Table 8 provides further details for the OT E (vrs) and AP EE (crs) models. Beginning at the latter pro…t-oriented model, the central producers were apparently unable to take pro…t of overcapacity 98/99 for electricity production. Consequently, the distributors show signi…cantly higher scores, only to fall below in 99/00 (not signi…cant). In passing, we note that ownership also has some in ‡uence. Cooperative distribution plants (org = 4) have signi…cantly lower technical e¢ciency OT E (vrs) than private or publicly operated plants. Further analysis of the characteristics of this group is necessary to draw any conclusion regarding this aspect of the market structure. Although the overall assessment of managerial ine¢ciency yields a fairly modest harvest, as above, there is still interest to investigate where the potentials may be the highest. Table 9 lists OT E (vrs) and OCE (vrs) results for some selected groups of plants. First, the natural gas plants score higher in technical operations OT E (vrs; 98) than other plants, but the cost e¢ciency is lower due to price increases OCE (vrs; 99) : Biofuel plants have considerably lower technical e¢ciency both years. Plants with both process heat and waste incineration heat recovery (x ind > 0 and x inc > 0) scored highly in cost e¢ciency both years and in technical e¢ciency 1998, but falls back to the common technical e¢ciency level in 1999. Finally, plants purchasing secondary heat score increasingly lower than other plants in terms of cost e¢ciency. This is most probably due to the e¤ect of a few very favorable heat purchase agreements that dominate in this part of the production set. Such outcome is also plausible since the price of heat recovery lacks an absolute comparator. Table 10 gives some highlights from the environmental e¢ciency model ACEE (vrs). Less surprisingly, coal-fueled plants score consistently poorly in terms of ACEE (vrs) . More notable is the …nding that biofueled plants in general score worse than other plants (including fossil-fueled). However, the economic arguments are evident in the comparison between cost e¢ciency OCE (vrs) and environmental e¢ciency ACEE (vrs) for plants with both oil and coal as primary fuels. The 18 plants concerned are among the most competitive in terms of cost, but are due to high emissions of carbondioxide environmentally ine¢cient. A similar …nding can be stated for the numerous plants that use oil as fuel to some extent.
Conclusion
By careful modelling of the district heating sector in Denmark, we have been able to estimate the technical, environmental, cost-, and structural e¢ciency along with cost estimates. The sector is characterized by heavy governmental involvement both on the supply and demand side, by subsidies for investments, fuels, preferential feed-in tari¤s and connection rights. When dismantling part of these distorting factors, the result is suboptimal operation, ine¢ciency. Considering the large range of realized costs per delivered heat unit, and in the light of recent discussion on informational rents and asymmetric information in the provision of regulated services, the public is inquiring whether the current situation is due to managerial in ‡uence.
In this paper, we argue that the impact of governmental action (plant size, fuel choice, network con…guration) is likely to be in the magnitude of three times more important than managerial performance. Given a certain plant size, fuel technology and regulated side activities, the local plant manager has a limited discretion when it comes to the total variable cost. Since the average plant size is small and purchases are not coordinated, the plant acts as price taker on the national fuel market. Substitution between fuels is possible only for certain biofuel con…gurations, not all of which are economically viable on the Danish market. Costs for administration and maintenance of the plants are usually limited and under considerable pressure.
In summary, the current study does not immediately translate to a performance based incentive system for district heating. Before such system can be conceived, clear directions are necessary as to the question of residual claimants of regulatory capture. If the local consumers, the current owners of Europe's most widespread district heating system, shall bear the burden of changes in the regulation structure that render their investments worthless, there may be more than the boilers who are to be put under heat.
